Legal Ethics v. Constitutional Rights by Funk, Robert E., Jr.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 3 
1968 
Legal Ethics v. Constitutional Rights 
Robert E. Funk Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Funk Jr., Legal Ethics v. Constitutional Rights, 5 Tulsa L. J. 315 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss3/6 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
ETHICS VS. RIGHTS
LEGAL ETHICS v. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
On December 5, 1967, the United States Supreme Court
handed down the third in a series of landmark decisions which
will undoubtedly cause a complete redrafting of legal canons
of ethics pertaining to solicitation1 and lay intermediaries. 2 In
United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Associa-
tionP the Court upheld the right of a labor union to employ a
licensed attorney on a salary basis in order to represent its
members in prosecuting workmen's compensation claims be-
fore the Illinois Industrial Commission. The trial court had
enjoined the union from employing an attorney for this pur-
pose and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The subsequent
decision of the United States Supreme Court upheld the con-
tention of the United Mine Workers that enjoining such em-
1 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 28. "It is unpro-
fessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at
common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles
or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed liti-
gation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries
or those having any other grounds of action in order to se-
cure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to
to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly
advice, influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured,
the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A
duty to the public and to the professional devolves upon
every member of the Bar having knowledge of such prac-
tices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to in-
form thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred."
2 ABA CANNONS OF PRoFrssioNAL ETcs, No. 35. "The profes-
sional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or ex-
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ployment "abridged their freedom of speech, petition, an d
assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."4
The first case leading toward the decision in the noted
case was NAACP v. Button5 in which the court considered a
Virginia statute enacted in 1956 which made it a misdemeanor
for any person or organization not having a pecuniary right
or liability in a lawsuit to solicit legal business for itself or
for any attorney.6 The NAACP which was advising Negroes
of their rights, encouraging them to commence desegregation
litigation, and offering legal and financial assistance in con-
nection therewith, brought action to enjoin the enforcement
of the statute. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the statute applied to the organization and that it could
not solicit legal business for any attorney. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute as construed
and applied violated the first and fourteenth amendment rights
of speech, petition and assembly.
The second case which set the stage for the decision in
the principle case was Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's respon-
sibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid
all relations which direct the performance of his duties by
or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation
to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering
aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organiza-
tion, such as an association, club or trade organization, to
render legal services in any matter in which the organiza-
tion, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should
not include the rendering of legal services to the members
of such organization in respect to their individual affairs."
3 389 U.S. 217.
4 Id.
5 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
6 VA. CODE A_NN. §§ 54-74, 78 to 79 (1958).
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Virginia.7 The Brotherhood was a fraternal and mutual bene-
fit society with the goal to promote the welfare of trainmen
and protect their families. The brotherhood provided legal as-
sistance by, among other things, recommending a highly quali-
fied attorney to members and their families. The state moved
to enjoin this activity as a solicitation prohibited by statute.8
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the state's
position. The United States Supreme Court, citing NAACP v.
Button, reversed stating that though the state has broad powers
to regulate the practice of law within the state it cannot there-
by infringe the Constitutional rights of speech, petition, and
assembly of individuals.
These three cases were decided by the Supreme Court by
using the "balancing test"9, i.e. balancing one's first and four-
teenth amendment rights of speech, assembly, and petition
against the right of the state to regulate the practice of law.
In regulating the practice of law many states have prohibited
solicitation' ° and the use of lay intermediaries" by statutes12
7 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
8 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-54 (1950). "The Commonwealth's at-
torney . . .may maintain a suit against any person, firm,
partnership or association which has acted for another in
the capacity of a runner or capper (agent for an attorney)
or which has been stirring up litigation in such a way as
to constitute maintenance .... "
9 See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); American Communications Ass'n.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944).
10 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938);
In re Co-op. Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); Rich-
mond Ass'n. of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n., 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937).
1 See, e.g., Howe v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 222, 298 Pac. 25 (1931);
In re, 269 App. Div. 74, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 126 (1945); In re Pace,
170 App. Div. 818, 156 N.Y.S. 641 (1915); Rhode Island Bar
Ass'n. v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139
(1935).
12 See notes 6, 8 supra.
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and canons of professional ethics. 8 These regulations went un-
attacked for many years, but in 1953 Drinker in his Legal
Ethics14 started the assault by suggesting:
"It is not believed that the Canon [ABA Canon 35 on
intermediaries] will prevent the labor unions from finding
a lawyer to advise their members. The whole modern
tendancy is in favor of such arrangements, including parti-
cularly employer and co-operative health services, the
principles of which, if applied to legal services, would
materially lower and spread the total cost to the lower in-
come groups. The real argument against their approval by
the bar is believed to be the loss of income to the lawyers
and concentration of service in the hands of fewer lawyers.
These features do not commend the profession to the pub-
lic."1 5
The first judicial attack was in the Button case10 in 1963,
but it was felt by some that the enjoining of the application
of the anti-solicitation statute in that case was due to the
strong political and racial overtones present. 7 The doubters
were stilled when an anti-solicitation statute was made inap-
plicable to a fraternal society in the Brotherhood case, and a
similar ethical canon was held not to control an attorney hired
by a labor union in the principle case.18
The other side of the scales used in the "balancing test"
has become heavily weighted in recent years. The first amend-
ment freedoms of speech, petition, and assembly have been
secured against violation by the states through the fourteenth
amendment.19 Consequently where individuals' rights out-
weigh the interest of the state in regulating, the state regula-
13 See notes 1, 2 Supra.
14 Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953).
15 Id. at 167.
16 See note 5, Supra and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Note Soliciting Litigation as a Protected Activity,
77 HARv L. REV. 122 (1963).
18 ...... U.S. at .......
19 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v.
Alabama 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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tion is going to give way to Constitutionally protected rights.
Of the three cases discussed here the following language from
the Brotherhood case shows most clearly the theory of the
court in saying that the scales have tipped in favor of indi-
vidual rights:
The right of members to consult with each other in a
fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to se-
lect a spokesman from their number who could be ex-
pected to give the wisest counsel. That is the role played
by the members who carry out the legal aid program.
... (A)nd the right of workers personally or through
a special department of their Brotherhood to advise con-
cerning the need for legal assistance - and, most im-
portantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely
on-is an inseparable part of this constitutionally guaran-
teed right to assist and advise each other.
... Laymen cannot be expected to know how to pro-
tect their rights when dealing with practiced and care-
fully counseled adversaries [citing Gideon v. Wainwright
... ], and for them to associate together to help one another
to preserve and enforce rights granted them under fed-
eral laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal
ethics. 20
The above argument is the same as that used by the court in
the principle case.
The decisions in UMWA, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Association and the two earlier cases may cause great prob-
lems in determining who may solicit and by what means. In
the future, it appears that the Court will have difficulty find-
ing significant distinctions between associational rights of
union members and those claimed by the members of other
nonpecuniary associations such as automobile clubs2 1 and as-
20 377 U.S. at 6-7.
21 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Chicago Motor Club,
362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935), noted in 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 296
(1936); People ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Motorists' Ass'n.,
354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1934); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n.
v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935).
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sociations of real estate taxpayers, 22 both of which have pre-
viously been prevented from maintaining legal aid plans by
state decisions.
Other problems raised by the principle case are the pos-
sibility of fee splitting between attorney and union and the
subjection of the attorney to control by the union by the con-
tinuing threat of withdrawal of union approval.
Obviously those who in the future draft statutes or canons
pertaining to solicitation and lay intermediaries will have to
take these and many other problems into consideration be-
cause to date the Supreme Court has failed to spell out how
far its decisions will be applied and to whom they will be
applicable.
Robert E. Funk, Jr.
22 People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n. of Real Estate Taxpayers
354 Il1. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933), noted in 2 U. CH. L. REv.
119 (1934).
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